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CHOOSE YOUR WORDS CAREFULLY:
REIMAGINING RETALIATORY ARREST AFTER
NIEVES V. BARTLETT
Ryan Hor*
In the summer of 2020, the United States experienced potentially its largest
ever social movement in the protests against racial inequality. Predictably,
protestors clashed with law enforcement officers, often leading to arrests.
Arrested individuals could bring § 1983 retaliatory arrest claims alleging
that the officers deprived them of their First Amendment right to free speech.
Such claims underline the tension between two vital interests: free speech
and law enforcement effectiveness.
In 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Nieves v. Bartlett, which crafted
a new framework for retaliatory arrest claims that consequently diminished
a plaintiff’s chance to prevail and recover damages. The Court held that,
aside from a narrow exception, the presence of probable cause would
extinguish the plaintiff’s claim. Rather than striking a balance between the
two interests, the Court heavily tipped the scale in favor of law enforcement.
Challenging the Court’s current position, this Note examines prior § 1983
retaliation decisions and concludes that a more appropriate framework
would eradicate the probable cause standard and instead permit
introduction of evidence of an officer’s subjective mindset. Further, to
overcome the causal complexity inherent in retaliatory arrest claims, this
Note advocates for the addition of a proximate cause requirement, such that
the interests of both parties can be adequately balanced. Ultimately, this
new framework provides the opportunity for both the plaintiff and the law
enforcement officer to litigate about the officer’s subjective motivation
surrounding the arrest.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most revered constitutional rights is the freedom of speech and
expression, the exercise of which should not be prohibited by government
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officials or law enforcement officers.1 But when an individual is arrested for
exercising that right, there may be grounds for a subsequent retaliatory arrest
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 In defending against such a suit, the
arresting officers often argue that the arrest was justified, principally due to
the presence of probable cause.3 Accordingly, two competing interests
directly conflict in cases involving retaliatory arrest: the freedom of speech
and the efficacy of law enforcement. As it currently stands, retaliatory arrest
jurisprudence staunchly favors the interests of law enforcement.4
The legal doctrine of retaliatory arrest has a greater practical effect and
import in times of social and political unrest. Though the United States’s
history is mired with protest, the summer and fall of 2020 saw perhaps the
largest protest movement in the nation’s history with an estimated twenty-six
million people who demonstrated in response to racial inequality
nationwide.5 Given the contentious interactions between law enforcement
officers and protestors in the current social climate, courts’ construal of
retaliatory arrest is especially consequential to balancing free speech and the
power of law enforcement.6
Consider two examples from the summer of 2020 illustrating the kind of
interactions where individuals believed they were arrested for engaging in
free speech. On May 29, 2020, CNN, like many other media networks,
deployed a television crew to cover the ongoing protests in the wake of
George Floyd’s death.7 At approximately 5:00 AM in Minnesota, CNN
correspondent Omar Jimenez and his crew were arrested on live television,
despite informing law enforcement of their role as journalists.8 CNN and
Jimenez maintain that the television crew’s arrest violated clearly established
First Amendment rights.9
Similarly, on June 2, 2020, a protester in Charleston, South Carolina, knelt
before law enforcement officers at the end of a tense day of civilian and

1. David L. Hudson Jr., Retaliatory Arrests, THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA
(2019),
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1647/retaliatory-arrests
[https://perma.cc/TM2Q-HX6K].
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see infra Part I.A.
3. See generally Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019).
4. See infra Part II.
5. Larry Buchanan, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History,
N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floydprotests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/ZE7Z-B39V].
6. See Derrick Bryson Taylor, George Floyd Protests: A Timeline, N.Y. TIMES
(July 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd-protests-timeline.html
[https://perma.cc/57B2-BYLN] (“[H]undreds of thousands of people joined largely peaceful
demonstrations throughout the country, but cities reported hundreds of arrests as protesters
clashed with the police . . . .”).
7. Jason Hanna & Amir Vera, CNN Crew Released from Police Custody After They Were
Arrested Live on Air in Minneapolis, CNN (May 29, 2020, 8:19 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/29/us/minneapolis-cnn-crew-arrested/index.html
[https://perma.cc/27CU-WEME].
8. See id.
9. See id.
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police conflict.10 The protester, Givionne Jordan Jr., can be seen on video
attempting to deliver a long and unifying speech, ending with: “Do you want
to make a stand? Do you want to make a change? Because if we charge you
and you charge us, what is that really doing?”11 Immediately thereafter, law
enforcement moved forward and arrested Jordan, seemingly singling him out
from the many protestors.12
These incidents did not occur in isolation. Variations of alleged law
enforcement retaliation in response to the exercise of protected speech, both
inside and outside the context of protest, have been well-documented.13
Though retaliation happens in many contexts, the current resurgence of
protests warrants the renewed urgency of this discussion.14
This Note analyzes and critiques how courts have construed the doctrine
of retaliatory arrest—a unique intersection of multiple legal fields. A typical
retaliatory arrest claim implicates the constitutional right of free expression,
Fourth Amendment procedural requirements placed on law enforcement, and
the general principle that where there is a legal wrong, the law provides a
remedy.15 As mentioned above, citizens have the constitutional right to
freely express their ideas without government infringement under the First
Amendment.16 To redress and deter such situations, wronged individuals
may file a § 1983 claim alleging that their constitutional rights under the First
10. Li Cohen, A Protestor Knelt Down to Tell Police He Loves and Respects Them. They
Threw Him in Jail., CBS NEWS (June 2, 2020, 4:04 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/
news/protester-knelt-down-to-tell-police-he-loves-and-respects-them-they-threw-him-in-jailcharleston-south-carolina/ [https://perma.cc/ZAC7-W4BD].
11. Rob Way (@RobWayTV), TWITTER (June 2, 2020, 2:07 PM),
https://twitter.com/RobWayTV/status/1267880521872412672
[https://perma.cc/Y3WMC73G].
12. See id.
13. See, e.g., Thayer v. Chiczweski, 705 F.3d 237, 250 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that police
likely had probable cause to arrest an antiwar protestor for disorderly conduct when he
engaged in blocking traffic); Snoeyenbos v. Curtis, 439 F. Supp. 3d 719, 732 (E.D. Va. 2020)
(holding that a police officer who offered lunch to another deputy to arrest a motorist who was
critical of police on social media was not liable under § 1983 due to the presence of probable
cause); Collins v. City of New York, 295 F. Supp. 3d 350, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding that
officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiffs who failed to disperse at an Occupy Wall Street
protest).
14. See, e.g., Thomas J. Sugrue, 2020 Is Not 1968: To Understand Today’s Protests, You
Must
Look
Further
Back,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
(June
11,
2020),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/2020/06/2020-not-1968/
[https://perma.cc/
9LMS-LHFS]. As of fall 2020, nationwide police brutality protests have arisen in the wake
of the death of George Floyd. Indeed, this wave of protests is the latest in a long line of civil
unrest dating to the nation’s origin. Id. For the purposes of this Note, specific protests are not
mentioned, but it is important to understand that protests, especially those charged with
political rhetoric, are common circumstances in which allegations of retaliatory arrest may
arise.
15. See generally Howard M. Wasserman, Argument Preview: Probable Cause,
Retaliatory Arrests, and the First Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 19, 2018, 2:59 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/argument-preview-probable-cause-retaliatory-arrestsand-the-first-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/DRW8-DG8E].
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I. While the First Amendment also extends to other fundamental
rights, the scope of this Note is limited to individuals who exercise their freedom of speech
and allege retaliation on behalf of law enforcement for the exercise thereof.
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Amendment had been violated, and consequently, they may seek monetary
damages.17
The courts, however, have struggled to apply a consistent framework to
retaliatory arrest claims that adequately balances the competing interests of
free speech and law enforcement.18 Some courts have been inconsistent in
determining what role, if any, probable cause plays in a retaliatory arrest
case.19 Further, in deciding a framework for retaliatory arrest, some circuit
courts have analogized retaliatory arrests to retaliatory prosecutions, which
require a plaintiff to prove an absence of probable cause to prevail.20
Alternatively, other circuit courts have distinguished retaliatory arrest from
retaliatory prosecution by demonstrating that circumstances surrounding
prosecution were fundamentally different from a typical arrest.21 In
particular, this latter group of circuit courts has found the existence of
prosecutorial immunity and the tenuous causal chain of retaliatory animus
from plaintiff to prosecutor to be too unique to import into simpler retaliatory
arrest cases.22 Therefore, to this second group of courts, the important
distinction between retaliatory arrest and retaliatory prosecution is that
retaliatory arrest claims do not require proving an absence of probable
cause.23
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this circuit split twice,24 culminating
in its decision in Nieves v. Bartlett.25 There, the Court offered two pathways
for a plaintiff to prevail on a § 1983 claim for retaliatory arrest: (1) by
proving an absence of probable cause or (2) by showing that, despite the
existence of probable cause, the officer arrested the plaintiff under
circumstances in which the officer would normally exercise discretion not to
do so and “similarly situated” individuals were not arrested.26 Courts tend to
give law enforcement the benefit of the doubt in retrospective examinations
of probable cause,27 and the Nieves Court itself was unclear as to how to
interpret or apply the second path it provided to the plaintiff.28 As a result,
Nieves has had the functional impact of greatly diminishing a plaintiff’s
chances of recovery under a § 1983 claim for retaliatory arrest.
Lawsuits alleging retaliatory arrest squarely pit the freedom of speech
against the efficacy of law enforcement officers in carrying out their duties
17. See infra Part I.A.
18. Compare Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006) (discussing retaliatory prosecution),
with Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (discussing
retaliatory termination from a teaching position).
19. See infra Part I.C.1.
20. See infra Part I.C.2.
21. See, e.g., Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 895–96 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that it is
unclear whether the presence of probable cause could extinguish the constitutional question).
22. See, e.g., Howards v. McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131, 1148 (10th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 566
U.S. 658 (2012).
23. See id.
24. See infra Part I.C.3.
25. 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019).
26. See id. at 1723–27; infra Part I.C.4.
27. See infra Part II.A.
28. See infra Part I.C.4.
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without fear of liability. The subsequent application of the retaliatory arrest
doctrine influences not only the power of law enforcement but also the civil
rights of the citizens who interact with them.29 As such, this Note recognizes
the validity of each of the competing interests of protected speech and
effective law enforcement and seeks to advocate for a solution that
adequately balances both interests.
Part I analyzes the legal background, namely the history of § 1983 tort
claims and the way the Supreme Court has construed § 1983 as it pertains to
First Amendment retaliatory arrests.30 Part II analyzes the decision in Nieves
v. Bartlett and the burdensome requirements that § 1983 plaintiffs must
overcome as a result.31 Finally, Part III advocates for a reconsideration of
the retaliatory arrest doctrine where evidence of subjective intent is
permissible and probable cause does not carry controlling weight in the
analysis.32
I. THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN RETALIATORY ARREST DOCTRINE
This part provides background on the areas of law implicated by the
complex doctrine of retaliatory arrest. First, this part discusses the history of
§ 1983 claims and examines how individuals who believe that their
constitutional rights were violated by law enforcement officers use this
statute as a mechanism for redress.33 Next, this part analyzes the two
principal questions that divided circuit courts on retaliatory arrest:
(1) whether to employ the Mt. Healthy City School District Board of
Education v. Doyle34 burden-shifting framework, which allows evidence of
the officer’s subjective mindset; and (2) whether the absence-of-probablecause standard from Hartman v. Moore35 for retaliatory prosecution should
apply to retaliatory arrest cases.36 Finally, this part addresses the Nieves
binary that leaves plaintiffs with the burden to demonstrate that no probable
cause existed, or more likely—given the probability that this burden cannot
be satisfied—how plaintiffs must then demonstrate similarly situated
individuals were not arrested.37

29. Arielle W. Tolman & David M. Shapiro, From City Council to the Streets: Protesting
Police Misconduct After Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 13 CHARLESTON L. REV. 49, 54–
55 (2018).
30. See infra Part I.
31. See infra Part II.
32. See infra Part III.
33. See infra Part I.A.
34. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
35. 547 U.S. 250 (2006).
36. See infra Part I.B.
37. See infra Part I.C.
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A. History of § 1983 Constitutional Torts
Constitutional torts are civil actions that an individual may bring to seek
monetary damages for the violation of a constitutional right.38 Section 1983,
the principal vehicle for such suits, provides a cause of action against a state
or municipal officer who commits a constitutional violation.39 If an
individual is arrested for what may be a deprivation of federal or
constitutional rights,40 that individual may bring a civil suit against the law
enforcement officer for monetary damages.41 The applicable law, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, states that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States . . . to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.”42
Accordingly, law enforcement officers who arrest individuals for engaging
in constitutionally protected speech face the prospect of civil liability.43
Understanding the history of § 1983 and its subsequent expansion in the
modern era provides crucial context for retaliation jurisprudence; the cause
of action arises not simply because a law enforcement officer retaliated
against an individual but because, in doing so, the officer deprived the
individual of the ability to engage in constitutionally protected conduct.44
Section 1983 emerged from the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,45 originating
as a means for Congress to enforce the newly enacted Fourteenth
Amendment.46 In particular, Congress worried that without this legislation,
state law would not always redress infringements of the Fourteenth
Amendment, either explicitly or in practice.47 Considering the extreme racial

38. Eric Williamson, Jeffries Makes Case for Reforming Constitutional Torts, UNIV. OF
VA. SCH. OF L. (Oct. 10, 2012), https://www.law.virginia.edu/news/2012_fall/jeffries_qa.htm
[https://perma.cc/EUV2-NB54].
39. While this Note focuses exclusively on plaintiffs who bring § 1983 claims for
retaliatory arrest claims, see Alex Langsam, Note, Breaking Bivens?: Falsification Claims
After Ziglar v. Abbasi and Reframing The Modern Bivens Doctrine, 88 FORDHAM L. REV.
1395 (2020), for a thorough discussion of an alternative means of seeking monetary damages
against federal government officials who have inflicted constitutional wrongs.
40. Section 1983 also provides monetary remedies for violations of federal statutory right.
See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 (1980) (“The statute states that fees are available
in any § 1983 action.”). This Note, however, will only consider constitutional violations.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Importantly, the text of § 1983 would include law enforcement
officers as individuals who could deprive citizens of their constitutional rights. In the context
of § 1983 liability for retaliatory arrest, this Note makes no distinction between law
enforcement officers and police officers.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 592 (noting that there is a
long-standing rule that the First Amendment prohibits retaliation for protected speech).
44. Randolph A. Robinson II, Policing the Police: Protecting Civil Remedies in Cases of
Retaliatory Arrest, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 499, 501 (2012).
45. Pub. L. No. 42-22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.); see Robinson, supra note 44, at 499 n.1.
46. See Michael T. Burke & Patricia A. Burton, Defining the Contours of Municipal
Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Monell Through City of Canton v. Harris, 18 STETSON L.
REV. 511, 513 (1989) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 68, 80, 83–85 (1871)).
47. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171–74 (1961).
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tensions of the time period, the legislation was considered vital to ensuring
that government officials did not violate the legal rights of Black citizens and
to giving these citizens a means of legal recourse.48
Originally, a § 1983 claim arose only when an official engaged in some
action taken under an authority expressly enumerated by state law or custom;
however, after Monroe v. Pape,49 the Court held that § 1983 also provides a
remedy when officers acting in their official capacity violated an individual’s
constitutional or federally guaranteed rights.50 Though the impact of this
distinction may not be readily apparent, it greatly expanded the scope of
§ 1983 to those seeking damages.51 Under earlier interpretations of § 1983,
individuals could not recover if the officer engaged in unauthorized
conduct.52 Instead, liability under § 1983 would only apply when the
unlawful action was “taken either in strict pursuance of some specific
command of state law or within the scope of executive discretion in the
administration of state laws.”53 Following Monroe, the resulting expansion
of what is now known as constitutional tort law allows prospective plaintiffs
to use § 1983 to seek redress when public officials engage in unauthorized
conduct and commit a wide variety of constitutional wrongs.54
Consequently, § 1983 is the statute of choice for plaintiffs in retaliation cases
that implicate and deprive potential plaintiffs of federal or constitutional
rights.55
B. The Elements of a Retaliation Claim
While retaliation claims could arise in a variety of contexts, this Note
focuses on plaintiffs who allege that law enforcement officers arrested them,
thereby depriving them of their constitutionally protected freedom of speech.
In essence, an individual who is arrested or otherwise retaliated against for
engaging in protected speech has the right, under the current interpretation of
§ 1983, to seek damages in a civil suit.56

48. Burke & Burton, supra note 46, at 513; Robinson, supra note 44, at 501.
49. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
50. Id. at 173–75; see also Robinson, supra note 44, at 501.
51. See Robinson, supra note 44, at 501. After the Monroe decision, any officer who
subverted an individual’s constitutional or federal rights could be sued in a civil capacity. In
contrast, prior to this case, individuals could only sue officers if the deprivation of their legal
rights originated from actions that officers enforced under express state law. See id.
52. See Burke & Burton, supra note 46, at 516 (citing Barney v. City of New York, 193
U.S. 430 (1904)).
53. See Burke & Burton, supra note 46, at 516 (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 213 (Harlan,
J., dissenting)).
54. See Burke & Burton, supra note 46, at 514.
55. See id. at 514; cf. Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1504 (11th Cir. 1985)
(holding that a plaintiff subjected to excessive force by a law enforcement officer was entitled
to use § 1983 as a means of seeking a civil remedy), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986); Fann
v. City of Cleveland, 616 F. Supp. 305, 314–15 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (holding that § 1983 permits
a remedy for invasion of the Fourth Amendment right to privacy when a plaintiff was
strip-searched).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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Therefore, to prevail in a retaliation claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must
prove that: (1) the plaintiff engaged in constitutionally protected speech; (2)
the government official or arresting officer caused the plaintiff to suffer an
injury, such as being the subject of arrest; and (3) the defendant’s actions
were motivated by the plaintiff’s engagement in constitutionally protected
conduct.57 Traditionally, if plaintiffs could prove each of these elements,
defendants then had the burden to prove that they would have taken the same
action absent the protected conduct.58
Addressing the first element, constitutionally protected speech in a
retaliation claim is generally inclusive of almost all conceivable speech.59 As
John Koerner points out, while defendants may argue that the plaintiff’s
speech is not protected, for example, because it fits a narrow exception such
as “fighting words,”60 courts are generally reluctant to find that an
individual’s speech is not considered “protected.”61 As a result, most cases
do not turn on whether the speech itself was actually worthy of First
Amendment protection, and this prong is relatively simple for a plaintiff to
satisfy.62
The plaintiff must then prove the existence of an injury.63 Though this
Note focuses primarily on injuries sustained as a result of alleged retaliatory
arrest, where the arrest itself is the injury, injuries in the retaliatory context
may also arise in situations of employment and prosecution.64 Further, the
magnitude of the injury in retaliation claims is immaterial to the lawsuit’s
legitimacy and, therefore, the injury prong of a retaliatory arrest claim is not
typically the controlling factor in the case.65
In light of the ease with which the first two elements of retaliation claims
may be satisfied, liability often turns on whether the defendant’s action was
57. John Koerner, Note, Between Healthy and Hartman: Probable Cause in Retaliatory
Arrest Cases, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 755, 759–60 (2009).
58. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
59. See Koerner, supra note 57, at 760–61.
60. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (holding that fighting
words are those that are threatening or would cause an ordinary man to understand that a fight
was about to occur).
61. Koerner, supra note 57, at 760–61; see, e.g., City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451,
461–62 (1987) (finding that the “fighting words doctrine” is a very narrow exception to
protected speech with limited applicability); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 896 (6th Cir.
2002) (holding that an individual who called a law enforcement officer a lewd name was “not
egregious enough” to meet the standard of “fighting words”); Posr v. Court Officer Shield No.
207, 180 F.3d 409, 416 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that vague, nonspecific statements without
more cannot satisfy the “fighting words standard”). But see Davis v. Twp. of Paulsboro, 421
F. Supp. 2d 835, 849–50 (D.N.J. 2006) (holding that an explicit threat to harm a law
enforcement officer satisfies the “fighting words” exception to protected speech).
62. Koerner, supra note 57, at 760–61.
63. Id. at 761.
64. See infra Part I.C.
65. See Koerner, supra note 57, at 761–62 (citing Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497
U.S. 62, 75 n.8 (1990) (finding that even minor injuries, such as an injury sustained by an
employer not throwing a birthday party for an employee, would satisfy the injury prong in a
retaliation claim if the action was performed with an animus to punish or retaliate against the
employee)).
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the cause of the plaintiff’s injury.66 Like other § 1983 claims, First
Amendment retaliation claims include a causation element.67 Accordingly,
a plaintiff alleging a violation of a constitutional right must prove that the
protected conduct was a “substantial factor” in motivating the defendant to
take the action ultimately culminating in the plaintiff’s injury.68 The
complexity of proving causation in retaliation claims led to two circuit splits,
which, after multiple attempts at clarifying the doctrine, culminated in
Nieves.
C. Nieves: The Supreme Court Crafts a Framework to Resolve Prior
Circuit Splits
This section examines how the circuit courts and the Supreme Court
struggled to apply retaliatory arrest claims before Nieves. Typical retaliation
claims under § 1983 adhered to the burden-shifting framework from Mt.
Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle.69 However,
circuit courts split on whether both retaliatory arrest and retaliatory
prosecution claims should be analyzed under that framework.70 Soon
thereafter, in Hartman v. Moore,71 the Supreme Court held that in retaliatory
prosecution cases, the Mt. Healthy framework did not apply, and the plaintiff
had to prove an absence of probable cause.72 Again, the circuits split—this
time on whether the absence-of-probable-cause requirement was limited to
retaliatory prosecution claims or should extend to retaliatory arrests, as
well.73 After multiple attempts at resolving the circuit split, the Court created
a definitive framework in Nieves v. Bartlett.74
1. Should the Mt. Healthy Burden-Shifting Framework Apply to
Retaliatory Arrest?
The Supreme Court first faced a retaliation claim in the context of a § 1983
lawsuit in Mt. Healthy, which ultimately set the framework for future
retaliation cases.75 The case revolved around Fred Doyle, a teacher
employed by the Mt. Healthy Board of Education from 1966 to 1971.76 In
his capacity as a teacher, he was elected president of the Teacher’s
66. Koerner, supra note 57, at 761–62.
67. See, e.g., Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 796 (1970) (holding that the
relationship between the alleged coercive interrogation and the plaintiff’s confession was too
attenuated and not the actual cause of the injury); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
491 (1963) (holding that a Fourteenth Amendment dispute arising from an involuntary
confession was too attenuated to satisfy the causal element).
68. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); infra
Part I.C.
69. Koerner, supra note 57, at 756.
70. See id. at 766–67.
71. 547 U.S. 250 (2006).
72. See id. at 261.
73. Koerner, supra note 57, at 775.
74. See generally Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019); infra Part I.C.3.
75. Koerner, supra note 57, at 761–62.
76. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 281 (1977).
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Association, where his work negotiating general contractual terms between
the teachers and the Board of Education led to tensions between the two
parties.77 In early 1970, Doyle was involved in multiple incidents that the
school deemed problematic.78 Specifically, he argued with school
employees in the cafeteria, referred to students in a derogatory manner within
a disciplinary complaint, and made obscene gestures to two female
students.79
One final incident pushed the Board of Education to terminate Doyle’s
employment altogether.80 In 1971, the principal of the school in which Doyle
worked circulated a memorandum specifying standards for “teacher dress
and appearance.”81 Shortly thereafter, Doyle called into a local radio show
detailing and critiquing this internal memorandum.82 One month later, the
superintendent of the Board of Education recommended that Doyle not be
rehired due to, in the superintendent’s opinion, Doyle’s unprofessional
handling of the matter.83
The Supreme Court held that Doyle was engaging in constitutionally
protected speech and that his subsequent termination constituted an injury.84
Regarding the causation element, the Court articulated that “[t]he
constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an employee
is placed in no worse a position than if he had not engaged in the conduct.”85
Accordingly, the Court stated that Doyle had the burden to prove that the
Board of Education considered his protected speech a substantial factor in
the decision not to rehire him.86 Notably, the Court expanded the typical
§ 1983 causation analysis. The Court established not only that a plaintiff
must prove that the defendant’s retaliatory action was an actual cause of the
injury but that, if this burden is satisfied, the defendant must have ample
opportunity to rebut the assertion by showing it would have taken the same
action absent any retaliatory motivation.87 Thus, once the plaintiff proved
causation, the burden shifted to the defendant to prove that the action was not
motivated by retaliatory animus.88
After Mt. Healthy, courts reviewing retaliation claims, even outside the
retaliatory arrest context, almost uniformly applied this burden-shifting
77. Id.
78. See id. at 281–82.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 282.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 284.
85. Id. at 285–86.
86. See id. at 287.
87. Id.
88. Koerner, supra note 57, at 763. When a plaintiff attempts to prove causation, the
standard is “substantial factor” because the imposition of but-for causation would “merge the
plaintiff’s prima facie case and the defendant’s rebuttal.” Id. The defendant’s burden on
rebuttal is to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the officer would have taken
the same action absent the protected conduct. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
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framework.89 However, circuit courts eventually split on how Mt. Healthy
should apply in retaliatory arrests and retaliatory prosecutions, disagreeing
specifically about the role that probable cause should play in the burdenshifting framework.90
On one side, the Second,91 Fifth,92 Eighth,93 and Eleventh94 Circuits did
not apply the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting framework and dismissed
retaliatory arrest and retaliatory prosecution cases without further inquiry
when the officer could demonstrate probable cause, effectively satisfying the
defendant’s rebuttal to the causation element.95 In contrast, the Tenth96 and
Sixth97 Circuits did not consider probable cause dispositive, instead treating
it as one of multiple types of evidence of the officer’s retaliatory animus and
continuing to apply the typical burden-shifting inquiry.98 Consequently, the
Supreme Court addressed the circuit split in Hartman v. Moore99 to
determine whether the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting framework should apply
to all retaliation cases, including retaliatory arrest and retaliatory
prosecution.100
2. Hartman: The Absence-of-Probable-Cause Standard in the Context of
Retaliatory Prosecution
In Hartman, a retaliatory prosecution case, the Court directly addressed
the question of whether a First Amendment retaliation claim could succeed
if the plaintiff failed to plead an absence of probable cause.101 There,
William Moore—the CEO of Recognition Equipment Inc., a multiline
optical scanning technology company—successfully lobbied the United
States Postal Service (USPS) to adopt the company’s technology for sorting
mail.102 Despite Moore’s initially successful efforts, USPS ultimately did
not extend the contract to Recognition Equipment Inc. and awarded the
contract to one of the company’s competitors.103 Soon thereafter, Moore was
investigated by USPS inspectors and was subsequently indicted by a grand

89. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving an employment decision was based on an impermissible criterion
constituting a substantial factor in the employment decision, upon which the burden shifts to
the defendant to prove the decision would have nevertheless been reached absent the
retaliatory motives).
90. See infra Part I.B.
91. Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119–20 (2d Cir. 1995).
92. Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 261–62 (5th Cir. 2002).
93. Benigni v. Smith, 121 F. App’x 164, 165–66 (8th Cir. 2005).
94. Redd v. City of Enterprise, 140 F.3d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 1998).
95. Koerner, supra note 57, at 769.
96. Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 895 (6th Cir. 2002).
97. DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990).
98. Koerner, supra note 57, at 774.
99. 547 U.S. 250 (2006).
100. Id. at 252.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 252–53.
103. See id. at 253.
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jury for his potential role in influencing the person who was elected
Postmaster General.104
After a six-week trial, the court acquitted Moore, suggesting there was a
“complete lack of direct evidence.”105 Empowered by the court’s finding,
Moore brought his own § 1983 action against the prosecutor and the USPS
inspectors involved in his initial investigation.106 Among the causes of
action, Moore alleged retaliatory prosecution, claiming that USPS conspired
with the prosecutor to initiate his prosecution because of his prior criticism
of USPS.107 The retaliatory prosecution claim was eventually heard by a
federal district court in the District of Columbia against only the USPS
inspectors, and the court dismissed the claim.108 However, after an appeal to
the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a growing
circuit split in retaliation jurisprudence.109 Ultimately, the Supreme Court,
finding Moore’s claim objectively unreasonable, held that a plaintiff who
brings a § 1983 retaliatory prosecution claim must allege and prove the
absence of probable cause to prevail.110
Importantly, while the decision did not entirely eradicate the Mt. Healthy
burden-shifting framework, it marked a shift in how the Court treated subsets
of retaliation claims.111 Going forward, the plaintiff in a retaliatory
prosecution case would have the burden of proving an absence of probable
cause.112 The Court diverged from Mt. Healthy for three main reasons:
(1) the complex causation unique to retaliatory prosecution claims, (2) the
evidentiary concerns, and (3) the presumption of prosecutorial regularity.113
However, the Court did not address whether this holding extended to
retaliatory arrests or was limited solely to retaliatory prosecution.114
Part of the reason that the Hartman Court diverged from the Mt. Healthy
standard was because, in the case of retaliatory prosecution, the causation
analysis is more complex than it is in a typical retaliation case.115
Specifically, the Court reasoned that “a plaintiff . . . must show that the
nonprosecuting official acted in retaliation, and must also show that [the
104. Id. at 253–54.
105. United States v. Recognition Equip. Inc., 725 F. Supp. 587, 596 (D.D.C. 1989).
106. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 252 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U.S. 388, 391 (1971) as Moore’s justification for bringing suit).
107. See id.
108. Id. at 255.
109. Id. at 255–56.
110. See id. at 257–59 (holding that the Mt. Healthy framework does not apply to retaliatory
prosecution).
111. Koerner, supra note 57, at 770–71.
112. See id. (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 771.
114. See id. at 771–72. The Court abandoned the Mt. Healthy standard in retaliatory
prosecution claims partially because of the inherent causal complexities regarding the role of
prosecutors. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 261 (2006). The Court did not decide
whether this distinction stands to muster in factually distinct retaliatory arrest cases and,
instead, focused on the specific features of retaliatory prosecution. See Koerner, supra note
57, at 772.
115. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 259–61.
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official] induced the prosecutor to bring charges that would not have been
initiated without his urging.”116 Further, prosecutors are typically immune
to suit, so the plaintiff must also sue those other individuals who induced the
prosecutor to bring charges, thereby adding another step to the causation
analysis.117 These factors complicate and lengthen the causal analysis,
meaning a plaintiff in a retaliatory prosecution would have to prove not only
that the plaintiff was arrested in retaliation for engaging in protected conduct
but also that the arresting officer caused him to be prosecuted for it.118
Taken together, the Hartman Court found that causation and probable
cause were inextricably linked, and to overcome the presumption of a
prosecutor’s regularity in decision-making, a plaintiff must affirmatively
show an absence of probable cause.119 The Court reasoned that probable
cause would likely arise in most retaliatory prosecution cases regardless, and
as such, its absence should be included as an element of the plaintiff’s prima
facie case.120
While it is clear that Hartman diverged from the burden-shifting
framework of Mt. Healthy, the ensuing requirement that plaintiffs must prove
an absence of probable cause was based largely on facts specific to retaliatory
prosecution, leaving it unclear whether the Hartman holding would extend
to retaliatory arrest cases.121 Once more, the circuit courts split—this time
specifically on Hartman’s applicability to retaliatory arrest cases.122 The
Second,123 Eighth,124 and Eleventh125 Circuits all embraced Hartman’s
heightened standard of proving an absence of probable cause.126 The Sixth

116. Id. at 262.
117. See id. at 261–62.
118. See id.
119. Koerner, supra note 57, at 771–72; Tolman & Shapiro, supra note 29, at 73–74.
120. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265.
121. Linda Zhang, Retaliatory Arrests and the First Amendment: The Chilling Effects of
Hartman v. Moore on the Freedom of Speech in the Age of Civilian Vigilance, 64 UCLA L.
REV. 1328, 1346 (2017). As Professor Zhang notes, the Court frequently mentioned the need
to prove a chain of causation “from animus to injury” regarding facts specific to retaliatory
prosecution cases. Id. (citing Hartman, 547 U.S. at 259).
122. See Zhang, supra note 121, at 1346.
123. See Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying the Mt. Healthy
standard when Curley was allegedly arrested in connection with his campaign statements
criticizing the village police chief).
124. See Williams v. City of Carl Junction, 480 F.3d 871, 876–77 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding
that plaintiff had to plead and prove an absence of probable cause when alleging that
twenty-six municipal citations were written in retaliation for his comments criticizing city
officials).
125. Phillips v. Irvin, 222 F. App’x 928, 929 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that law enforcement
officers had probable cause based on dash camera footage showing Officer Irwin’s eight
repeated requests to plaintiff to back off so that law enforcement officers could complete his
federal traffic stop).
126. Zhang, supra note 121, at 1343.
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Circuit did not commit to either standard.127 In contrast, the Ninth128 and
Tenth129 Circuits held that Hartman was a narrow case limited to retaliatory
prosecution and, instead, applied the typical Mt. Healthy burden-shifting
framework to retaliatory arrest cases where probable cause was one of
multiple types of relevant evidence.130
3. Reichle and Lozman: Foreshadowing the Future Framework
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split regarding
which standard should apply to retaliatory arrest cases in Reichle v.
Howards.131 There, the plaintiff was arrested for assault after verbally
accosting Vice President Dick Cheney and allegedly making physical contact
with him.132 After being arrested, plaintiff Steven Howards denied ever
assaulting the vice president and alleged he was arrested as retaliation for his
verbal criticism.133 Rather than definitively solving the circuit split, the
Court ruled against Howards on qualified immunity grounds.134 Importantly,
however, the Court left open the idea, in dicta, that retaliatory prosecution
was sufficiently similar to retaliatory arrest and that it would be open to such
an extension of Hartman in the future.135
Once more, the Supreme Court addressed Hartman’s applicability to
retaliatory arrests in Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach.136 However, the Court
did not resolve the Mt. Healthy-Hartman circuit split due to the specific facts
of the case.137 In Lozman, the plaintiff owned a floating home in a marina
127. See Kennedy v. City of Villa Hills, 635 F.3d 210, 217 n.4 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that
a plaintiff bringing an ordinary retaliation claim may not need to demonstrate a lack of
probable cause); Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 355 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that
Hartman was about a retaliatory prosecution, which involves more complex causal chains);
Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 720 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that Hartman applies to all
retaliation claims, not just claims of retaliatory prosecution).
128. Skoog v. Cnty. of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1232 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a
plaintiff does not need to plead the absence of probable cause to prevail).
129. Howards v. McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131, 1148 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that Hartman
is limited only to retaliatory prosecution cases), rev’d, 566 U.S. 658 (2012).
130. Zhang, supra note 121, at 1347.
131. 565 U.S. 1078 (2011).
132. Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 661 (2012).
133. See id. at 662–63.
134. See id. at 670. Qualified immunity insulates government officials from civil liability
so long as their actions did not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). To be clearly established, “the contours of the
right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). In Reichle, the
Court held that it was unclear whether Hartman applied to retaliatory arrests, and thus, there
was not a clearly established right. See Reichle, 566 U.S. at 668–69. Therefore, the law
enforcement officers were entitled to qualified immunity. See id. at 670.
135. See id. at 667–68. Though not essential to the qualified immunity principle, the Court
laid out the basis for future decisions by explicitly comparing retaliatory prosecution with
retaliatory arrest, namely the typical presence of probable cause in both. Id.
136. 138 S. Ct. 1945 (2018).
137. See Michael G. Mills, Note, The Death of Retaliatory Arrest Claims: The Supreme
Court’s Attempt to Kill Retaliatory Arrest Claims in Nieves v. Bartlett, 105 CORNELL L. REV.
2059, 2072–73 (2020). In discussing a case that was decided after Lozman, Mills described
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owned by the city of Riviera Beach.138 At the time, the plaintiff had harshly
criticized the city’s plan to use eminent domain to seize homes in the marina
for the eventual use of private development.139 According to Lozman’s
allegations, the city council held a closed-door meeting, and the transcript
purportedly showed an official city plan to intimidate Lozman.140 Five
months later, Lozman was arrested at a public meeting while voicing his
complaints about city policy.141
Lozman acknowledged that there was probable cause for the arrest, but he
nonetheless claimed that the presence of probable cause should not defeat his
First Amendment claim.142 The Court acknowledged that either Mt. Healthy
or Hartman could feasibly control the outcome of the case given the lack of
clarity surrounding the Court’s retaliatory arrest jurisprudence.143 While
giving credence to both opposing arguments, the Court held that the factual
irregularity of the case—a coordinated city policy meant to intimidate
Lozman—made it an improper vehicle to resolve the circuit split.144 The
Court stated that the question of “whether in a retaliatory arrest case the
Hartman approach should apply, thus barring a suit where probable cause
exists, or, on the other hand, the inquiry should be governed only by Mt.
Healthy is a determination that must await a different case.”145 Deciding the
case narrowly, the Court held that Lozman “need not prove the absence of
probable cause to maintain a claim of retaliatory arrest against the City.”146
The Court’s decision to not definitively outline the framework for retaliatory
arrest cases thus left the door open for future deliberation.147
4. Nieves: The Supreme Court Responds
After two prior attempts, the Court resolved the question regarding the
absence-of-probable-cause standard in Nieves v. Bartlett.148 Bartlett was an
Alaskan resident who attended a winter sports festival when he encountered
Lozman’s holding as “incredibly fact specific” and stated that it “has little applicability.” See
id. at 2095 n.227.
138. Lozman, 138 S. Ct. at 1949.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1949–50.
142. Id. at 1951.
143. See id. at 1951–54.
144. See id. at 1954.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1955 (“On facts like these, Mt. Healthy provides the correct standard for
assessing a retaliatory arrest claim. The Court need not, and does not, address the elements
required to prove a retaliatory arrest claim in other contexts.”).
147. See id. at 1955–56 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas expressed his concern
that the majority seemed to fashion a narrow ruling that did not address the circuit split, saying,
“The petition for certiorari asked us to resolve whether ‘the existence of probable cause
defeat[s] a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim as a matter of law’ . . . . Yet the Court
chooses not to resolve that question.” Id. He also expressed his discontent with the narrow
scope of the ruling, stating, “I find it hard to believe there will be many cases where this rule
will even arguably apply . . . . Not even Lozman’s case is a good fit.” Id. at 1956.
148. See generally Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019).
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Sergeant Nieves, who had been talking to a few attendees whom he believed
may have been underage and intoxicated.149 Bartlett then admonished the
attendees not to talk to the police.150 A few minutes later, a different police
officer asked underage drinkers where they had obtained alcohol.151 Bartlett
angrily confronted the trooper, and Sergeant Nieves intervened, arresting
Bartlett.152 Importantly—and disputed by the parties—Nieves told Bartlett
while arresting him, “[B]et you wish you would have talked to me now.”153
This statement provided justification for Bartlett to allege that he was arrested
in retaliation for engaging in protected speech.154
Resolving the circuit split, the Court created a framework with a narrow
exception: like retaliatory prosecution claims in Hartman, a showing of
probable cause defeats any claim of retaliatory arrest, except where probable
cause exists but an officer would not typically arrest another individual in
similar circumstances or where otherwise similarly situated individuals were
not arrested.155 In so holding, the Court noted the similarities in the causal
complexities between retaliatory prosecutions and retaliatory arrests.156
Further, the Court emphasized the need for an objective test to prevent a flood
of cases alleging subjective biases from entering the lower courts.157 In sum,
the Court applied Hartman standards to retaliatory arrest claims with a minor
exception, thereby establishing the framework under which future § 1983
retaliatory arrest claims for First Amendment deprivations would be
analyzed.158
II. THE IMPACT OF PROBABLE CAUSE ON RETALIATORY ARREST
JURISPRUDENCE
Following the Court’s decision in Nieves, a retaliatory arrest plaintiff must
make an affirmative showing of probable cause—a doctrine fundamentally
rooted in the Fourth Amendment that determines whether an arrest was
valid—to prevail on the claim.159 First, this part will explain how courts have
conventionally applied probable cause, often resulting in greater protection
for the interest of effective law enforcement.160 Second, this part will
examine how, due to the flexibility and breadth of probable cause, lower
courts applying the Nieves framework typically have not found plaintiffs to

149. Id. at 1717–18.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 1720–21.
152. Id. at 1721.
153. Id.
154. See id. (“The protected speech, according to Bartlett, was his refusal to speak with
Nieves earlier in the evening and his intervention in Weight’s discussion with the underage
partygoer.”).
155. See id. at 1727.
156. See id. at 1723–24.
157. See id. at 1725.
158. See infra Part II.
159. See, e.g., Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 173–-32; infra Part III.B.
160. See infra Part II.A.

890

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

be successful in their § 1983 retaliatory arrest claims.161 Finally, this part
identifies multiple cases in which, following Nieves, the absence of a
probable cause requirement and a narrow exception have actually precluded
individuals from recovering on First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims.162
A. The Probable Cause Standard: Deference to Law Enforcement
Expertise
Following the Court’s decision in Nieves, a plaintiff alleging a § 1983
claim for retaliatory arrest must affirmatively prove an absence of probable
cause to prevail, unless the arrest occurred in a context in which law
enforcement typically exercises discretion not to make an arrest.163 By
instituting this framework, Nieves had the practical effect of leaving § 1983
plaintiffs alleging retaliatory arrest with two narrow paths to success.164
Accordingly, a plaintiff’s prospects of success in a § 1983 claim rest
largely on whether there was an absence of probable cause, meaning that the
probable cause analysis is crucial to retaliatory arrest claims. However, the
Supreme Court has deliberately chosen not to give a clear, technical
definition to probable cause.165 Instead, the Court has opted for a more
flexible approach in which probable cause is determined “based on the
totality of the circumstances.”166 In doing so, the Court has established a
probable cause framework that is readily adaptable to the incredible variety
of criminal contexts in which questions of probable cause arise.167
Furthermore, this flexible, nontechnical approach allows law enforcement
officers “to rely on their expertise, intuition, and observational skills to
decide whether suspicious behavior warrants further action, without the
constraints of an otherwise rigid test.”168
Probable cause is itself a vast area of law, and while probable cause
inquiries vary widely,169 this Note only considers instances where law
enforcement officers acted with probable cause when allegedly arresting an
individual for protected speech. Courts confronted with this type of probable
cause inquiry consider whether the circumstances and particular facts of a
case would warrant law enforcement’s reasonable belief that an offense has
161. See infra Part II.B.
162. See infra Part II.C.
163. See Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1727.
164. See, e.g., Mills, supra note 137, at 2075.
165. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (“[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—
turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts.”).
166. Erica Goldberg, Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause Inquiry, 17 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 789, 790 (2013).
167. Id. at 790–91.
168. Id.
169. Compare Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (holding that a magistrate judge
had probable cause to issue a search warrant based on an informant’s anonymous tip), with
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 384 (2014) (holding that a reasonable suspicion requirement
is more appropriate than probable cause in the search incident to the arrest of the petitioner’s
cellphone). For a more exhaustive analysis of probable cause, see WILLIAM E. RINGEL,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 4:4 (2d ed. 2021).
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been or is being committed.170 Moreover, the existence of probable cause
depends on the reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the facts known
to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.171
Consider, however, probable cause as a probability standard.172 It is
unclear how certain a reasonable law enforcement officer must be in
believing a crime either “has been or is being committed.”173 Rather than
attempting to quantify a level of certainty, courts have relied on yet another
flexible term: “fair probability.”174 In doing so, the Supreme Court
pragmatically refused to create a technical framework for defining probable
cause and, instead, stated that “probable cause is a fluid concept—turning on
the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or
even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”175 Accordingly, the Court
acknowledged the need for a flexible and commonsense application, like the
fair-probability standard that could readily be understood by law
enforcement.176
Keeping in mind the flexible probable cause standard, the Court in Nieves
also relied on the conventional distinction between objective and subjective
justifications for probable cause.177 Specifically, the Court based its
reasoning on its decision in Devenpeck v. Alford.178 There, the Court had
articulated the fundamental idea that an arresting officer’s state of mind is
“irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.”179 In fact, this case marked
a culmination of decisions suggesting similar sentiments, particularly that
“the Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain
actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective
intent.”180 Ultimately, the Court has stressed that effective evaluation of law
enforcement is best achieved through objective examination rather than by
questioning an officer’s subjective state of mind.181 As applied in the context
of retaliatory arrest, probable cause does not permit an examination of the
officer’s subjective state of mind, though that could be helpful in determining
the motive for the arrest.182
But just as importantly, by not requiring law enforcement officers to
divulge any subjective reasoning to explain their actions, the Court has
impliedly authorized law enforcement to justify an arrest after its

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003).
See Goldberg, supra note 166, at 792.
Id.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
See id. at 232.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1724–25 (2019).
543 U.S. 146 (2004).
Id. at 153.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996).
See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990).
See Nieves, 139 U.S. at 1737–41 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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occurrence.183 As stated in Devenpeck, the probable cause need not be for
an “offense actually invoked at the time of arrest.”184 Plainly, an officer
could arrest an individual for engaging in protected speech and later “check
the statute books” to justify the action.185 Thus, law enforcement officers are
able to retrospectively point out any criminal law that could provide the basis
for the flexible probable cause standard, regardless of whether the arrest was
motivated by probable cause for that specific crime, all while escaping any
inquiry into subjective motives law enforcement officers may have had.186
In sum, while it is very difficult for plaintiffs to prove the absence of
probable cause in a retaliatory arrest context, it is easy for law enforcement
officers to demonstrate its presence. While plaintiffs in a retaliatory arrest
claim may allege that the officer acted with retaliatory animus, the court’s
inability to peer into the subjective mindset of an officer when determining
probable cause all but eliminates any other potential causes of the arrest,
namely retaliation for protected conduct.187 Further, the probable cause
doctrine deliberately obfuscates any technical or legal definition, instead
relying on law enforcement’s intuition and professional expertise when
making an arrest, so long as officers demonstrate that there is a fair
probability that a crime has been or is being committed.188
Finally, when courts’ construal of probable cause also permits officers to
identify ex post reasoning for the arrest, especially when trivial crimes such
as traffic stops remain enforceable, scholars such as Professor Wayne Logan
have suggested that the requirement of probable cause as a precursor to arrest
loses much of its meaning.189 As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg pointed out
in her dissent in Nieves, “given the array of laws proscribing, e.g., breach of
the peace, disorderly conduct, obstructing public ways, failure to comply
with a peace officer’s instruction, and loitering, police may justify an arrest
as based on probable cause when the arrest was in fact prompted by a
retaliatory motive.”190 Therefore, as explained by Justice Ginsburg,
requiring a plaintiff in a retaliatory arrest claim to prove an absence of
probable cause creates a nearly insurmountable burden for the plaintiff. By
183. See Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153 (holding that even though an officer’s state of mind
may not provide the legal justification for probable cause, the objective factual circumstances
can give rise to probable cause when challenged later).
184. Id.
185. Nieves, 139 U.S. at 1741 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that this application of
probable cause places too high of a burden on retaliatory arrest plaintiffs).
186. See Mills, supra note 137, at 2076–77.
187. See id.
188. Wayne A. Logan, Reasonableness as a Rule: A Paean to Justice O’Connor’s Dissent
in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 79 MISS. L.J. 115, 137–38 (2009) (“So long as probable
cause exists that some offense occurred, an arrest is constitutionally reasonable, even if the
legal basis is not specified, or indeed, if the basis initially specified turns out to lack legal
justification.”).
189. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1997) (discussing the ways that outdated or trivial laws,
such as minor traffic crimes, allow officers to search for ex post support for reasonable
suspicion or probable cause, essentially undercutting the reason that probable cause exists).
190. Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1734 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

2021]

RETALIATORY ARREST AFTER NIEVES V. BARTLETT

893

foreclosing the plaintiff from delving into the arresting officer’s subjective
mindset, the framework ultimately frustrates the entire purpose of retaliatory
arrest claims.
B. Nieves Binary: Showing an Absence of Probable Cause or Proving the
Exception
Given the Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of probable cause,
legitimate questions arise regarding whether a plaintiff alleging a § 1983
retaliatory arrest claim can succeed under any circumstances. This part
describes the burden a retaliatory arrest plaintiff must sustain in attempting
to prove probable cause. Furthermore, this part demonstrates that even in the
unlikely event that some semblance of probable cause cannot be
demonstrated by the defendant officer, a plaintiff’s second path to success
under the Nieves exception is generally unclear, as well.
In Nieves, the Court held that plaintiffs cannot prevail unless they can
prove an absence of probable cause, except where an officer has probable
cause to make an arrest but normally would exercise discretion not to do
so.191 Therefore, the Nieves Court crafted a binary for retaliatory arrest
plaintiffs: either prove an absence of probable cause or demonstrate that law
enforcement officers typically do not arrest similarly situated persons.192
When the Court created this exception, it avoided creating the bright-line
rule that an absence of probable cause will always defeat a retaliatory arrest
claim.193 While this narrow exception means that probable cause will not
always defeat a retaliatory arrest claim, the imprecision of the exception’s
methodology nonetheless imposes a similar burden on the plaintiff.194
Specifically addressing the exception laid out by the majority, Justice
Sotomayor identified the exception’s lack of clarity.195 In particular, she
noted that it “is far from clear” what the majority meant by “objective
evidence,” “otherwise similarly situated,” and “same sort of protected
speech.”196 Seemingly, the majority’s approach indicates that an individual
claiming retaliatory arrest would have to, under the Nieves exception:
(1) concede that probable cause existed, (2) identify other individuals who
faced similar circumstances regarding the protected speech and the arrest,
and (3) show that the same individuals were not arrested.197 In practice, the
narrow exception seems to hinder retaliatory arrest plaintiffs who, if they

191. See id. at 1726 (majority opinion).
192. See id.
193. See id. at 1727 (“[A]n unyielding requirement to show the absence of probable cause
could pose ‘a risk that some police officers may exploit the arrest power as a means of
suppressing speech.’” (quoting Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1953–54
(2018))).
194. See id. at 1735 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (questioning how the exception was
formulated, namely, identifying the lack of precedent and statutory background that warranted
the creation of the narrow exception).
195. See id. at 1741.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 1740.
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cannot prove an absence of probable cause, must identify with particularity
a similar fact pattern that yielded different results, without clear direction as
to how that showing can be made.198
Considering both ways in which a retaliatory arrest plaintiff can prevail in
a § 1983 lawsuit, neither alternative presents an effective means for recovery.
First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the arresting officer, despite the vast
number of state and federal criminal statutes, did not reasonably believe that
there was a fair probability of past or current criminal activity.199 Since such
a requirement is difficult to prove, especially given the fact that evidence
regarding the arresting officer’s subjective mindset is prohibited, the plaintiff
is left to hope that the narrow exception can be satisfied.200 But to satisfy the
exception, the plaintiff must present objective evidence showing that
similarly situated individuals were not arrested for conducting the same
actions—an especially difficult burden given the lack of clear guidance from
the Court on how a plaintiff may do so.201 Either option then—in practice,
if not in theory—is prohibitively difficult for plaintiffs to prove. The Nieves
Court may have increased the burden on § 1983 retaliatory arrest plaintiffs.
C. The Practical Consequences of Nieves on Retaliation Jurisprudence
Though the above discussion about probable cause suggests the Nieves
framework would prevent relief for plaintiffs, a survey of circuit decisions
demonstrates that the concern is not purely hypothetical. Of these cases,
most did not proceed past the probable cause inquiry, and none of the
plaintiffs ultimately recovered.
1. No Recovery Under Nieves
One way to identify whether Justice Sotomayor’s fears have been
vindicated is to analyze how Nieves has been interpreted by lower courts.
Some circuit courts have directly considered a First Amendment claim
following Nieves, leading to one plaintiff surviving a summary judgment
motion but leaving most to lose on the merits at trial.202 Other circuits—the
198. See id. (explaining that, in the case of a retaliatory arrest when an individual is arrested
for recording a police officer, according to the majority’s exception, the individual would have
the burden of looking to other bystanders who were also recording the police officer but were
not arrested).
199. See supra Part II.A.
200. See supra Part II.A.
201. See Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1739–42 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The basic error of the
Court’s new rule is that it arbitrarily fetishizes one specific type of motive evidence—
treatment of comparators—at the expense of other modes of proof.”).
202. Capp v. Cnty. of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1057–58 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasizing
that “this is likely to be a very close case,” but since plaintiffs pled that the defendants were
motivated purely by retaliation and this was a summary judgment motion and the plaintiffs
were pro se, the ultimate decision on the merits would be left to the factfinder). Importantly,
this Note acknowledges that a plaintiff may settle the case after surviving summary
judgment—or at any other stage in the lawsuit. However, the focus of this Note is that,
generally, the Nieves framework has had the practical impact of diminishing a plaintiff’s
chance at winning the case on the merits not on potential settlement. Though settlement is
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Sixth,203 Tenth,204 and Eleventh205 Circuits—each emphasize the probable
cause standard from Nieves in denying retaliatory arrest claims and did not
find evidence to satisfy the narrow exception, despite ancillary claims of
additional retaliatory motives.206 Though admittedly a small sample size, an
analysis of the courts’ holdings demonstrates the overwhelming burden a
§ 1983 plaintiff has in order to prevail in a retaliatory arrest claim.
a. Hinkle v. Beckham Board of County Commissioners
In Hinkle v. Beckham Board of County Commissioners,207 Laramie
Hinkle, a former police officer, was arrested for what he alleged was
supporting the sheriff’s election opponent.208 However, the deputy who
arrested Hinkle claimed that Hinkle owned a stolen trailer, based on evidence
that was obtained from the trailer’s former owner and that was corroborated
by the insurance company.209 After the arrest, the arresting officer learned
that the former owner, a pastor, actually had two trailers and that the
insurance company supposedly committed a clerical error when
corroborating the pastor’s original story.210 Once the exculpatory evidence
was eventually brought to light, Hinkle sued the county, alleging, among
other claims, retaliatory arrest.211 Addressing this claim, the Tenth Circuit
cited Nieves to emphasize that a retaliatory arrest claim should not include
inquiry into the subjective mindset of the arresting officer.212 Indeed, the
court engaged in a lengthy analysis of probable cause, once more making it
clear that probable cause is “not a high bar” for arresting officers to meet.213
Finding that probable cause existed, despite the clerical error, and finding no
evidence existed to satisfy the narrow Nieves exception, the court dismissed
the retaliatory arrest claim.214

clearly possible, the circuit court cases below demonstrate a lack of strong retaliatory arrest
precedent that would yield favorable results for plaintiffs.
203. Hartman v. Thompson, 931 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2019).
204. Hinkle v. Beckham Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 962 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2020).
205. Demartini v. Town of Gulf Stream, 942 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2019).
206. See, e.g., Novak v. City of Parma, 932 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2019). Though Sixth Circuit
jurisprudence on this issue is discussed later in this Note, dicta in this case points out a different
flaw in applying Nieves. See id. at 431. The court notes that in some instances, as here where
the plaintiff operated a parody police department Facebook account, separating speech and
conduct is impossible. Id. Finally, the court went on to note that this type of arrest was
precisely the kind that the Supreme Court was worried about in Nieves, namely, a situation in
which an individual is arrested and the only potential criminal conduct was engaging in
protected speech. See id.
207. 962 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2020).
208. Id. at 1214.
209. See id. at 1211.
210. See id. at 1215–17.
211. See id. at 1217.
212. Id. at 1227 (“The Nieves Court adopted this objective test of probable cause to avoid
an unwelcome result of using an officer’s subjective state of mind . . . .”).
213. Id. at 1220 (quoting Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014)).
214. See id. at 1228.
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b. Hartman v. Thompson
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that law enforcement officers had
probable cause to arrest plaintiffs for causing a disruption while the plaintiffs
protested outside a delegated “protest zone.”215 The plaintiffs were arrested
because their failure to disperse from the specific area in a timely manner
meant “a reasonable officer would have probable cause.”216 Even in this
summary judgment motion, the Court found that probable cause warranted
immediate dismissal of the retaliatory arrest claim.217
c. Demartini v. Town of Gulf Stream
The Eleventh Circuit also emphasized the role that probable cause plays in
retaliatory arrest claims without even considering the Nieves exception in
Demartini v. Town of Gulf Stream.218 There, the plaintiff alleged that the
town’s suit filed against her, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO),219 was retaliatory in that it was brought against
her after she exercised her First Amendment speech rights in filing nearly
2000 public records requests.220 After a lengthy analysis, the court extended
the Nieves requirement of proving an absence of probable cause to retaliation
in this non-arrest context of a civil suit initiated by the town.221 In doing so,
the court went so far as to say that “[j]ust as a citizen may have the right to
sue the government, the government likewise has the right, and duty, to
engage in legitimate responsive litigation to defend itself against such
challenges.”222 Ultimately, the court held that since the town had probable
cause to initiate a RICO lawsuit, as a matter of law, no retaliation claim could
prevail.223
d. Lund v. City of Rockford
Despite each of these cases finding that probable cause existed, only one
circuit case included in this survey has actually analyzed and discussed the
Nieves exception. In this outlier case, the Seventh Circuit, in Lund v. City of
Rockford,224 championed the “common sense” approach outlined by Justice
Gorsuch in Nieves.225 Accordingly, the plaintiff was not required to produce
215. Hartman v. Thompson, 931 F.3d 471, 481–83 (6th Cir. 2019).
216. Id. at 482 (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.160 (West 1980)).
217. See id. 484–85.
218. 942 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. DeMartini v. Town of Gulf
Stream, 141 S. Ct. 660 (2020).
219. 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
220. See id. at 1282–87.
221. See id. at 1304 (“Based on the factors discussed in the Supreme Court’s Hartman and
Nieves decisions, we conclude that . . . the presence of probable cause will generally defeat a
§ 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim based on a civil lawsuit as a matter of law.”).
222. Id.
223. See id. at 1303–04.
224. Lund v. City of Rockford, 956 F.3d 938, 943–45 (7th Cir. 2020).
225. Id. at 945 (quoting Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019)).
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comparison-based evidence demonstrating that other people at the scene of
the crime were not arrested but rather some sort of “objective evidence that
he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals [would not
be].”226
Interestingly, while the Lund court adhered to this
“commonsensical[]” approach to the Nieves exception, it did not articulate
what the “objective evidence” would actually constitute or, alternatively,
how an individual could prove it.227 There, the plaintiff alleged he was
arrested for filming a police “sting” operation, and the officers contended he
was arrested for riding an electric bike incorrectly down a one-way street.228
The Court noted that the arresting officers doubtlessly had probable cause
and that the plaintiff’s claim was defeated.229 The plaintiff did not provide
any evidence that could satisfy the Nieves exception, even under the
“commonsensical[]” approach.230
However, the court stressed that
“comparison-based evidence” demonstrating that other individuals present at
the scene of the crime were not arrested—which Justice Sotomayor was
concerned was mandated by the Nieves exception—was not necessary.231
Given the application of Nieves by lower court cases, two things are clear.
First, the probable cause standard is not only easy to meet but also has
predictably existed in each case.232 Second, the closest a plaintiff has come
to satisfying the Nieves limited exception was in Lund, but the court still
failed to describe what would constitute objective comparison-based
evidence that would allow a plaintiff to prevail.233 Practically, the Nieves
decision may have caused retaliatory arrest plaintiffs to have no legitimate
chance at recourse.
III. NO MORE NIEVES: A RESOLUTION FOCUSED ON RETALIATION
Before addressing this Note’s proposed solution to the nearly
insurmountable burden Nieves has placed on prospective retaliatory arrest
plaintiffs, it is important to briefly acknowledge that three other student notes
have sought to address this problem.234 While each note provides a marked
improvement on the current state of retaliatory arrest jurisprudence, this Note
advocates for more expansive change in a unique capacity.235
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id. at 941–42.
229. See id. at 945–46.
230. See id. at 946.
231. Id. at 945–46.
232. See supra Parts II.A–B.
233. See Lund, 956 F.3d at 945.
234. See generally John S. Clayton, Note, Policing the Press: Retaliatory Arrests of
Newsgatherers After Nieves v. Bartlett, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 2275 (2020); Brenna Darling,
Note, A (Very) Unlikely Hero: How United States v. Armstrong Can Save Retaliatory Arrest
Claims After Nieves v. Bartlett, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 2221 (2020); Mills, supra note 137.
235. For an interesting discussion on the commonsensical approach to the Nieves
exception, see Mills, supra note 137, at 2094–101. In particular, Mills suggests that the
“similarly situated individuals” analysis could be informed using a commonsensical reading
of United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). In addition, Mills employs a
burden-shifting analysis borrowed from employment discrimination cases. See id. at 2098.

898

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

As this Note has shown, a mechanical application of the Nieves test,
especially the absence-of-probable-cause standard, would unduly burden the
rights of First Amendment retaliatory arrest plaintiffs seeking relief.
Therefore, this part addresses three important considerations in turn. First,
Part III.A tracks the respective opinions of Justices Gorsuch and Sotomayor
in holding that probable cause is, at best, one of multiple relevant
considerations in a retaliatory arrest claim.236 Part III.B proposes a solution
that expands and adapts the prior Mt. Healthy standard to adequately consider
the competing interests in a typical retaliatory arrest case; Part III.B also
attempts to account for the inherent causal complexities while affording
probable cause an appropriate weight in the analysis.237 Finally, Part III.C
demonstrates how the proposed solution would be practically implemented
and addresses big-picture concerns regarding the balancing of law
enforcement and First Amendment rights.238
A. Probable Cause: A Fourth Amendment Concept?
Given the expansive construction and highly discretionary nature of
probable cause,239 this Note focuses on a methodology in which probable
cause is not afforded disproportionate weight in retaliatory arrest claims.
Ultimately, in a case in which an individual alleges retaliation that violates
First Amendment speech rights, the Fourth Amendment doctrine of probable
cause should not provide such a high bar to recovery. This part advocates
for a framework that recognizes that probable cause may have some influence
but should not categorically bar recovery when probable cause is present.
Particularly insightful are the respective analyses in Justice Gorsuch’s
concurrence and Justice Sotomayor’s dissent. Starting first with a textual
analysis of § 1983, Justice Gorsuch states that nowhere in the text of the
statute does the term “probable cause” appear.240 However, noting that
“[c]ourts often assume that Congress adopts statutes against the backdrop of
the common law,” Justice Gorsuch states that this statute should be read in

Mills focuses his advocacy on expanding and more clearly articulating the process involved
in the Nieves exception. See id. at 2094–101. Similarly, Darling also uses Armstrong in
crafting a framework that would, analogizing to retaliatory prosecution, create another
exception to Nieves that would permit the court to examine the officer’s unconstitutional
intent. See Darling, supra note 234. This Note takes the stance, as do the aforementioned
notes, that the Supreme Court has used Armstrong sparingly, rarely finding unconstitutional
intent on behalf of government officials, and thus, this Note proceeds differently. See id. at
2224.
236. Infra Part III.A.
237. See infra Part III.B.
238. See infra Part III.C.
239. See supra Part II.A.
240. Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1730 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“But look
at [§ 1983] as long as you like and you will find no reference to the presence or absence of
probable cause as a precondition or defense to any suit.”). Though not immediately relevant
to the above argument, Justice Gorsuch also insists that by creating a requirement that a
plaintiff must show probable cause, the Court effectively enacts new law—an activity which
is the province of the legislature. See id.
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harmony with general principles of tort immunities.241 Here, the relevant
common-law backdrop are the torts of false arrest and false imprisonment,
neither of which is directly applicable and thus should not influence
retaliatory arrest claims.242
Importantly, the torts of false arrest and false imprisonment are intended
to provide a remedy for individuals who are arrested or detained without
lawful authority, thereby making probable cause a central inquiry.243 Justice
Gorsuch states that these two torts doctrines are, when deeply considered,
Fourth Amendment claims.244 As he explains, false arrest precedent
considers warrantless arrest unsupported by probable cause to be an
unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.245 Accordingly,
the majority wrongfully accepted the argument that “[b]ecause those two
torts . . . required plaintiffs to plead and prove an absence of probable cause
for their detention or prosecution, a Section 1983 plaintiff alleging retaliatory
arrest must do the same.”246
In contrast, the First Amendment operates separately from the Fourth
Amendment and protects fundamentally different interests; the right from
unlawful search and seizure is different from the right to engage in protected
speech.247 Furthermore, § 1983 was intended to “vindicate violations of
‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . .’”248 State
tort rules should only serve to fill in gaps in § 1983 when those rules are
compatible with the statute’s purpose.249 As such, the majority’s reliance on
probable cause afforded disproportionate weight to a doctrine more
appropriate in the Fourth Amendment context than in the First Amendment
context in which retaliatory arrest resides.
Perhaps most illustrative of the argument that probable cause should not
be controlling in First Amendment retaliation is Justice Gorsuch’s analogue
to the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence in similar contexts.250
Referencing Yick Wo v. Hopkins,251 Justice Gorsuch articulated that it is
universally accepted that an otherwise legal detention, had it been based on
241. Id. at 1730–31.
242. Id. 1731 (explaining that the common-law doctrines of false arrest or false
imprisonment are to provide remedies to those arrested without warrants or probable cause).
243. See id.
244. See id. (citing Manuel v. Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 919 (2017)).
245. Id. at 1731–32.
246. See Brief of Constitutional Accountability Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 4, Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019) (No. 17-1174).
247. Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1732 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[A] First Amendment retaliatory
arrest claim serves a different purpose than a Fourth Amendment unreasonable arrest claim,
and that purpose does not depend on the presence or absence of probable cause.”).
248. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also
supra Part I.A.
249. See Brief of Constitutional Accountability Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 10–19, Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019) (No. 17-1174) (explaining
that Justices should not be empowered to make freewheeling policy choices in interpreting
§ 1983 claims).
250. See id. at 1731–32.
251. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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racially discriminatory factors, violates the detainee’s Fourteenth
Amendment protections.252 In Yick Wo, Chinese immigrants were arrested
for illegally operating laundries without permits even though law
enforcement officers took no action against white laundry operators engaged
in the same activity.253 Though probable cause doubtlessly existed and a
violation of the law occurred, the enforcement of that action nonetheless
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.254 Importantly, while probable cause
may have been relevant to whether the detainment was constitutional, the
ultimate question before the Court was whether the detainment violated equal
protection principles—a question on which probable cause had little to no
bearing.255
Thus, the question remains: what role should probable cause play in
retaliatory arrest when the protected conduct is constitutionally protected
speech? If First Amendment interests can be analogized to equal protection
jurisprudence, whether an arrest is valid and whether the protected speech
caused retaliation are two separate questions.256 Conversely, the argument
that probable cause is completely irrelevant to a retaliatory arrest claim also
seems illogical.257 The unique challenge of retaliation cases is to recognize
that two things may simultaneously be true: (1) the arrest was valid and
based on a flexible probable cause standard, and (2) the arrest was in
retaliation for constitutionally protected speech or conduct.
This Note advocates for a framework that reconciles these two truths and
attempts to create a better mechanism for balancing the interests of plaintiffs
and law enforcement officers. First, despite the Court’s unequivocal
rejection of subjective evidence of the officer’s mindset, an effective
framework must permit such evidence to demonstrate retaliatory motive.258
252. Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1731 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
253. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373–74.
254. See id.; see also Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J. Dep’t of L. and Pub. Safety–Div. of
State Police, 411 F.3d 427, 440 (3d Cir. 2005); Hedgepeth ex rel. Hedgepeth v. Wash. Metro.
Area Transit Auth., 386 F.3d 1148, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Marshall v. Columbia Lea Reg’l
Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157, 1166 (10th Cir. 2003); Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F.3d 509, 521 (6th Cir.
2003); Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 999–1000 (8th Cir. 2003); Holland v. Portland, 102
F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1996). Each of these cases decided by courts within the Ninth Circuit
reflects the courts’ opinion that when the plaintiffs’ arrests were based on racial animus, the
plaintiffs did not need to show a lack of probable cause. The general idea is that a successful
equal protection claim had considerations fully independent from Fourth Amendment
probable cause inquiries.
255. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373–74.
256. See Hedgepeth, 386 F.3d 1148, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“[S]imply because a practice
passes muster under the Fourth Amendment (arrest based on probable cause) does not mean
that unequal treatment with respect to that practice is consistent with equal protection.”).
257. See Nieves, 139 S. Ct at 1732 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“But while it would be a
mistake to think the absence of probable cause is an essential element of a First Amendment
retaliatory arrest claim . . . I acknowledge that it may also be a mistake to assume that probable
cause is entirely irrelevant. . . .”).
258. Contra Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (holding that an officer’s state
of mind is “irrelevant”). As mentioned above, the Court’s reasoning in grafting this
no-probable-cause requirement, and therefore establishing a reliance on objective evidence,
was based on the idea that the plaintiff in a retaliatory arrest case was essentially questioning
the validity of the arrest. Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1724–25. However, the Court was not asked to
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Second, any framework must overcome the causal complexities inherent in
retaliatory arrest cases. Finally, probable cause must not itself categorically
defeat a retaliation claim, but evidence thereof should be one of many factors
considered among other evidence. The framework presented in Part III.C
considers each of these issues and attempts to dispel some of the majority’s
concerns about retaliatory arrest in Nieves.
B. Balancing Subjective Intent and Probable Cause: A New Framework
To address these concerns, this Note advocates for a solution generally
reminiscent of the Mt. Healthy standards but with a variety of key changes.
Though both this Note’s framework and Mt. Healthy’s standards require the
officer to show the arrest did not occur in retaliation, how the officer can
prove that is different. Rather than focusing on whether the officer had
probable cause or whether the officer would have normally undertaken such
action, this Note’s framework focuses on evidence of the officer’s subjective
mindset and retaliatory animus.
To prevail under this proposed, modified framework, the plaintiff must
show through the evidence of the officer’s intent (1) that the plaintiff engaged
in constitutionally protected speech, (2) that the plaintiff suffered an injury
(typically through arrest), (3) and that the protected speech was the actual
and (4) proximate cause of the officer retaliating and initiating an arrest.
Should the plaintiff meet this burden, the law enforcement officer could still
rebut the claim by providing evidence to dispute the retaliatory motive. The
officer’s burden would therefore not necessarily require demonstrating that
there was probable cause for the arrest and that the officer would have taken
the same action anyway but, instead, that the arrest did not occur in retaliation
for protected speech. Under this Note’s framework, the key inquiry is
whether the retaliation caused the plaintiff’s injury (arrest), not whether the
arrest was valid. While the officer would not be foreclosed from using
evidence of probable cause, whether the existence of probable cause could
overcome the evidence of retaliation would be a question for the
factfinder.259
Before addressing the implications of this framework, it is worth
mentioning that, though it is similar to Mt. Healthy’s framework, this
framework differs in the reoriented burden-shifting analysis that takes
place.260 Like circuit courts that applied Mt. Healthy to retaliatory arrest,
evidence about subjective intent is permitted under this Note’s suggested
framework. However, under Mt. Healthy, once the plaintiff successfully
makes this showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the arrest
invalidate an arrest but rather was asked whether the arrest was motivated by retaliatory
animus. See id. at 1722. Thus, subjective intent of the officer, including the officer’s
statements, should be considered. See id. at 1740 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining that
an objective no-probable-cause standard that does not permit evidence of an officer’s intent
would make evidence such as video recordings irrelevant).
259. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 594 (1998) (rejecting a clear and convincing
standard for constitutional claims that require proof of improper intent, such as retaliation).
260. See generally Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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would have occurred regardless of the alleged retaliatory motive, often
prompting the production of evidence that the arrest was based on probable
cause.261 In contrast to this Note’s proposal, then, the Mt. Healthy framework
inevitably focuses on the validity of the arrest, not the retaliation that is the
foundation of the lawsuit. This Note’s framework rejects that particular
element of the burden-shifting framework to avoid unduly emphasizing the
role of probable cause in retaliatory arrest.262 Instead, the defendant’s burden
would be to demonstrate the lack of a retaliatory motive, not simply that the
arrest would have occurred regardless.
Finally, this Note’s framework also adds a proximate cause requirement to
ensure that the link between the protected conduct and the arrest was not
overly attenuated. This new element to the retaliatory arrest framework
ensures that, where too many steps separate the injury from the alleged
retaliatory conduct, the law enforcement officer will not be liable.
To illustrate an application of this framework, this Note considers the
incident involving the CNN reporter mentioned in the Introduction and
discusses how the application of this Note’s framework to a hypothetical case
arising from that incident would differ from the application of the Nieves
framework. In doing so, this Note addresses the concerns from Nieves while
simultaneously demonstrating how this Note’s framework functions.
Recall that Jimenez, a CNN reporter covering protests in Minnesota, was
arrested for, in his opinion, engaging in constitutionally protected speech.263
If Jimenez brought a § 1983 claim under Nieves, he would need to prove an
absence of probable cause. Presuming that the arresting officer could point
to any possible criminal statute and demonstrate a reasonable belief that an
offense had been committed, Jimenez could not satisfy the Nieves
absence-of-probable-cause standard.264 Accordingly, he would then have to
show that despite the presence of probable cause, similarly situated
individuals were not arrested.
Depending on how the court would interpret the Nieves exception,
Jimenez’s claim could succeed. For example, the court could determine that
“similarly situated individuals” comprised other journalists who have
doubtlessly covered protests while engaging in the same conduct who were
not arrested. In contrast, the court could adopt Justice Sotomayor’s approach
261. See id. at 283–87; see also notes 95–97 and accompanying text.
262. See Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 898 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that, had there been
probable cause and insufficient evidence of retaliation, the Mt. Healthy standard would be
satisfied).
263. See notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
264. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.50(2) (2021). Here, the text states that an individual will
be guilty of obstructing legal process if the individual “obstructs, resists, or interferes with a
peace officer while the officer is engaged in the performance of official duties.“ Id. Sparing
the reader a statutory analysis of whether this statute’s text would warrant convicting Jimenez,
it is worth remembering that the officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant in determining
probable cause. See generally Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996). Therefore,
any number of potential crimes that a reasonable officer could have believed that Jimenez
committed would constitute probable cause, even if the officer articulated his suspicion ex
post. Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1741 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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and require Jimenez to point to other individuals at the scene of the alleged
misconduct who were not arrested when he was.265 Ultimately, given the
high bar of the Nieves absence-of-probable-cause standard and the lack of
clarity in how courts construe the exception, there is a substantial likelihood
that Jimenez may not recover on his retaliatory arrest claim.
Under this Note’s proposed framework, a different likely result emerges.
First, as a news reporter who was live on air, Jimenez was engaging in
protected conduct.266 Secondly, he was arrested, which would constitute the
requisite injury needed. It is under the causation prongs, however, that this
Note’s framework differs drastically from Nieves and even Mt. Healthy.
1. Actual Causation
Starting with the actual causation requirement, Jimenez would have to
submit evidence that his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial
factor in his arrest. As articulated in Mt. Healthy, he must show that the
arresting officer’s conduct was substantially motivated by Jimenez’s exercise
of First Amendment rights.267 Given that the question before the court would
be whether the arrest was in retaliation for protected conduct, not whether the
arrest itself was valid, Jimenez would not be foreclosed from introducing
evidence regarding the officer’s intentions or mindset as he would be under
Nieves. At this point, Jimenez could offer evidence to support the alleged
retaliatory motive;268 he would not have to prove an absence of probable
cause. Since Jimenez identified himself as a CNN reporter and spoke with
police, since other journalists nearby were not arrested, and, most
importantly, since he was reporting about the police in the context of a protest
sparked by police brutality, there is a decent likelihood that Jimenez could
prove that retaliation was a substantial factor in his arrest.269 That said, actual
causation is not the end of a plaintiff’s burden.

265. Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1741 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“It is hard to see what point is
served by requiring a journalist arrested for jaywalking to point to specific other jaywalkers
who got a free pass . . . .”).
266. See Clayton, supra note 234, at 2284–85 (“[C]ircuit courts have unanimously held
that open video recording of police and government officials in public constitutes protected
First Amendment activity, subject to reasonable time, manner, and place restrictions.”). The
First Amendment rights as they pertain to the press are well established. N.Y. Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (“The Government’s power to
censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the
Government.”).
267. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
268. According to CNN’s live on-air coverage, the arresting officer told Jimenez that he
was being arrested and they were just following orders, implying that there was more to the
arrest than a legal infraction. Hanna & Vera, supra note 7.
269. See id.
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2. Overcoming the Nieves Causal Complexity with a Proximate Cause
Analysis
Presuming that Jimenez can prove that his protected conduct was a
substantial factor in his arrest, unlike Nieves or Mt. Healthy, this framework
imposes a proximate cause requirement, as well. In doing so, this framework
borrows a concept from other tort actions and attempts to ensure that there is
an essential link between the protected conduct and the retaliatory arrest. The
touchstone of proximate cause is the directness of the relationship between
the conduct in question and the injury.270 Thus, the plaintiff would have to
show that the arrest was a direct result of the protected conduct.271 Moreover,
a proximate cause requirement would require Jimenez to show that there
were no intervening factors between the protected conduct and his arrest.272
For example, an individual who engages in protected speech, then engages
in multiple other activities later in the day, any one of which could have led
to the arrest, would have broken the causal chain and would therefore fail the
proximate cause element under this Note’s framework.
In this instance, Jimenez could likely demonstrate that there was proximate
cause linking his protected speech to his arrest. There were no intervening
factors; he was arrested while live on air. Furthermore, Jimenez could, under
the new framework, put forth evidence demonstrating that his protected
speech was directly linked to his arrest. For example, should the factfinder
believe that the law enforcement officers arrested Jimenez during his ongoing
coverage of the protest, meaning no time had elapsed between Jimenez
engaging in the protected conduct and his arrest, the proximate cause prong
of this Note’s framework would likely be satisfied.
3. The Limited Role of Probable Cause
This scenario, unlike the scenario in Mt. Healthy, presents a different
burden-shifting framework. Rather than permitting the law enforcement
officer to demonstrate the validity of the arrest through a probable cause
standard, a successful defense would require breaking—or at least casting
doubt on—the causal chain from the protected conduct to the arrest or
demonstrating a lack of retaliatory motive. Accordingly, the question before
the court would not be whether the arrest should be invalidated but whether
the retaliatory animus violated the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.
It is worth noting, however, that while the validity of the arrest invokes the
Fourth Amendment and the question of protected speech invokes the First
Amendment, even Justices Gorsuch and Sotomayor cast doubt on whether
probable cause was wholly irrelevant.273 Though the threshold question is
270. See W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 264 (5th ed.
1984).
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1732 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); id. at 1736
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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whether the arrest was in retaliation for protected conduct, law enforcement
officers would likely argue that probable cause existed for the arrest, even
under this framework. But, the presence or absence of probable cause should
not have controlling influence on the claim. Instead, it should be one factor
that may be persuasive when considered alongside the other evidence.
To illustrate this point, the officers who arrested Jimenez could argue that
his allegations of retaliatory animus did not cause his arrest. Rather, the
officer may point to probable cause for violation of Minnesota’s obstruction
of the peace statute.274 However, Jimenez would likely introduce evidence
of what the arresting officer said to him, that other news reporters were not
arrested, and anything else that may indicate retaliation for his news
coverage. Therefore, even if probable cause existed, a neutral factfinder may
still conclude that Jimenez engaged in protected conduct that gave rise to the
officer’s retaliatory animus that was both the actual and proximate cause of
his arrest. Thus, probable cause should be treated as just one of many other
types of evidence that the factfinder considers in determining whether there
was a retaliatory arrest. Instead, the officer would have a better chance at
rebutting the alleged retaliatory animus through the production of evidence
that indicated no retaliatory motive was present, perhaps using eyewitness
testimony or body camera footage of the arrest.
In sum, this new framework permits both the plaintiff and the law
enforcement officer to litigate the officer’s motivation for the arrest. Unlike
in Nieves, a plaintiff can—and must—provide evidence of subjective
retaliatory animus to prevail. Probable cause may be considered, but it
should not be disproportionately weighted in comparison to other evidence.
C. The Comparative Advantage of a New Framework
This Note’s framework provides a more balanced mechanism to preserve
the First Amendment rights of retaliatory arrest plaintiffs while still
considering the practical concerns of law enforcement officers, as articulated
by the Nieves Court. There, the Court was concerned about these interests
but also was weary of permitting evidence of subjective intent, the potential
floodgates of litigation, and the causal complexity of retaliation cases that
would accompany a different retaliatory arrest framework.275 Yet, this new
framework overcomes each concern.
The Nieves Court ultimately rejected the idea that the officers’ subjective
intent was relevant when it mistakenly classified the retaliatory arrest as a
Fourth Amendment question.276 In contrast, this Note’s framework adopts
the positions of Justices Gorsuch and Sotomayor, both of whom correctly
274. MINN. STAT. § 609.50(2) (2021); cf. Stuntz, supra note 189, at 7 (discussing the
breadth of criminal statutes permitting law enforcement officers to point to any statute where
there may have been probable cause).
275. See Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1723–28.
276. See id. at 1724–26 (“In the Fourth Amendment context, however, ‘we have almost
uniformly rejected invitations to probe subjective intent.’” (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
U.S. 731, 736 (2011))).
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identify that the plaintiff is not seeking redress for a Fourth Amendment
violation but a First Amendment one.277 By recognizing this key distinction,
the majority’s reliance on Fourth Amendment precedent to foreclose
evidence of subjective intent no longer makes logical sense.278 Realistically,
what sense would it make—in a retaliatory arrest suit in which the inquiry
hinges on an officer’s motivation—to foreclose any inquiry into that officer’s
subjective intent?
The Nieves Court argued that evidence proceeding solely on allegations
regarding an arresting officer’s mental state would chill law enforcement’s
efficacy.279 The Court went on to suggest that allegations pertaining to a
police officer’s subjective mindset would be “easy to allege and hard to
disprove.”280 Furthermore, policing certain events, such as an unruly protest,
“would pose overwhelming litigation risks.”281 Essentially, this argument
amounts to the fear that law enforcement officers would be unable to
effectively carry out their duties for constant fear that they could be subject
to retaliatory arrest lawsuits where a plaintiff could baselessly allege
retaliatory animus. While perhaps legitimate concerns, these practical
considerations are not supported by the reasoning of courts that have
employed the similar Mt. Healthy standard, which like this Note’s
framework, allowed for evidence of subjective intent.
Recall that, prior to Nieves, there was a circuit split as to whether
Hartman’s absence-of-probable-cause standard should extend from
retaliatory prosecution to retaliatory arrest.282 As such, some circuits
continued to follow the Mt. Healthy standard and permitted retaliatory arrest
plaintiffs to allege evidence of the arresting officer’s subjective motivations;
yet none of the circuits faced overwhelming amounts of retaliatory arrest
litigation.283 For example, in the Ninth Circuit, the Northern District of
California registered only three cases related to retaliatory arrest in 2018.284
In the Central District of California, five retaliatory arrest cases occurred in
2018.285 Moreover, in the District of Alaska, the Nieves case was the only
one involving retaliatory arrest.286 Similarly low numbers appear in the
Southern District of California, the District of Hawaii, the District of Nevada,

277. See supra Part III.B.
278. Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1732 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[A] First Amendment retaliatory
arrest claim serves a different purpose than a Fourth Amendment unreasonable arrest claim,
and that purpose does not depend on the presence or absence of probable cause.”); id. at 1735
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining that “the issue here is not whether an arrest motivated
by protected speech may violate the First Amendment despite probable cause for the arrest;
the question is under what circumstances § 1983 permits a remedy”).
279. See id. at 1725 (majority opinion).
280. Id. (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998)).
281. Id.
282. See supra Part I.C.1.
283. See supra Part I.C.1.
284. See Brief of Three Individual Activists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at
6–7, Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019) (No. 17-1174).
285. Id. at 7.
286. Id. at 8–10.
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the District of Oregon, and the Western District of Washington.287 Of cases
brought in all the district courts in the Ninth Circuit, only fifty-seven cases
involving retaliatory arrest occurred from January 2013 to December
2018.288 Any fear of the Nieves Court that pleading evidence of an officer’s
subjective mindset would unduly expose law enforcement to excessive
litigation has proven wholly unfounded.
Therefore, the litigation history does not support the majority’s concern
that a framework permitting evidence of the officer’s mindset would open
the floodgates of retaliatory arrest claims. Furthermore, as underscored by
the lack of cases listed above, there is little evidence to suggest that the
circuits adopting a Mt. Healthy framework experienced a chilling effect on
law enforcement officers, such that they could no longer effectively perform
their duties.289 By failing to acknowledge the practical consequences in
circuits that permitted evidence of subjective intent, the majority’s concerns
proved merely hypothetical. To the extent that this Note’s framework adopts
Mt. Healthy’s inclusion of evidence of the officer’s subjective mindset, it
follows that this framework would yield similar results.
Another major concern of the Nieves Court was the causal complexity
inherent in retaliation cases.290 Essentially, the Court reasoned that in
retaliatory arrest claims it is “particularly difficult to determine whether the
adverse government action was caused by the officer’s malice or the
plaintiff’s potentially criminal conduct.”291 This Note’s framework better
addresses this concern. Specifically, the reason that retaliatory arrest cases
have causal complexities is threefold. First, it can be difficult to determine—
as an evidentiary matter—whether an arrest was motivated by animus or the
need to make an arrest.292 Second, protected speech is often a legitimate
consideration for the officer when deciding whether to make an arrest.293
Finally, in some instances the speech itself can be the source of probable
cause prompting the arrest.294 Since the Nieves Court, despite adopting a
Hartman standard, acknowledged that retaliatory arrest and prosecution has
a more attenuated causal connection than instances where the speech itself is
the source of probable cause, this Note need not address the third point.295
With this Note’s framework, both the first and second concerns are
addressed through the admission of evidence indicating the arresting
officer’s subjective mindset. Whether this evidence can ultimately
demonstrate that the officer’s motivation was rooted in animus is a question
287. See id. at 9.
288. See id. at 7–10.
289. See supra Part II.C.1.
290. See Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 U.S. 1715, 1723–24 (2019).
291. Id. at 1724.
292. See id. at 1723 (holding that “even when an officer’s animus is clear, it does not
necessarily show that the officer ‘induced the action of a prosecutor who would not have
pressed charges otherwise’” (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 263 (2006))).
293. Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 668 (2012) (holding that protected speech is often
a “wholly legitimate consideration” for officers when deciding whether to make an arrest).
294. See Clayton, supra note 234, at 29.
295. See Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1721–23.
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for the jury, but both parties have the opportunity to plead their case. This
would ensure that a plaintiff would only recover in the instance that there was
proof that the retaliatory animus was both the actual and proximate cause of
the arrest. Whether the officer considered the protected speech when making
the arrest would surely be relevant. Likewise, when an individual’s conduct
is the only reason for his arrest, evidence of subjective motivation is of even
greater importance. Accordingly, a plaintiff would have the burden of proof,
which the officer may attempt to contradict. The factfinder can be entrusted
to determine the cause of the arrest, thereby dispelling the first and second
concerns.296
As a result, this Note’s solution would ensure that plaintiffs have a
framework in which their protected speech is better guarded by permitting
evidence of subjective motivation. Such an approach would neither lead to
a flood of litigation (evidenced by the Ninth Circuit’s very limited litigation
history) nor chill the actions of law enforcement. Furthermore, this Note
rejects the burden-shifting framework in Mt. Healthy that would unduly
emphasize probable cause. Instead, this Note permits officers to refute
plaintiffs’ evidence and demonstrate that their conduct was not rooted in
retaliatory animus. The added proximate cause element also ensures that
where the relationship between the protected conduct and the arrest is too
attenuated, the officer will not be liable. This approach not only better
addresses the Nieves Court’s concerns but also better balances the
constitutional rights of plaintiffs without sacrificing the efficacy of law
enforcement.
CONCLUSION
The Nieves framework is untenable, both in its protection of First
Amendment rights and in its functional impact on retaliatory arrest plaintiffs.
An approach that deliberately casts aside the officer’s subjective motivations
in favor of an extremely deferential probable cause standard cannot
adequately balance the interests at hand.
In contrast, this Note’s framework recognizes the inherent differences in
First Amendment and Fourth Amendment interests, underlining the
relevance of evidence showing an officer’s motivations while not completely
divorcing probable cause from the inquiry. Moreover, to address the causal
complexity, this framework’s actual and proximate cause elements ensure
that the litigation is focused on whether the protected speech itself caused the
retaliatory arrest—not whether the arrest was valid because of the presence
of probable cause. In a nation where free speech is revered, this new
framework provides plaintiffs with a greater chance to recover when their
free speech right is unjustly taken from them.

296. See id. at 1737 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“With regard to the majority’s concern
that establishing a causal link to retaliatory animus will be complex: That is true of most
unconstitutional claims, yet we generally trust that courts are up to the task of managing
them.”).

